BIP 33: Phase 1 of Decentralizing Badger DAO

[Justsomeguy]

Great to see this taking place, well done.

[NatyShi]

Yep, time to go to this level! Keep rocking BadgerDAO! To infinite and beyond!

[fsbadger]

What will the process be for:

• revoking and rotating in and out multisig members
• compromised key policy
• multisig private key secure storage
• key health checks

[rocket]

@Spadaboom

Expand the number of signers required from 3/5 to a 5/7.

Not very familiar with multisig wallets. What does this mean?
5/7 means that 5 out of 7 are required to sign for a transaction?

[gismar]

exactly, so you have 7 public multisig members and need 5 of them to approve (sign) the transaction. for it to pass.

[gismar]

yaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaay only thing that comes to mind

[MarkOSullivan94]

Would like to see a response from the developer team about this

Chris Blec (ChrisBlec)

[LendingCrypto]

This project is definitely moving in the right direction, and at a fast pace! Badgers don’t waste time, let’s keep digging!

[chrisblec]

It doesn’t really matter whether the multisig members are known or not, because there’s no way to prove that the multisig keys are in unique hands. For instance, one person could have created all 5 keys then distributed them to 4 other people. The creator would still have all 5 keys. This is an inherent problem with using multisigs for admin keys, and is why they may be good for appearances but terrible for improving trustlessness.

The timelock is the only thing of value that’s being implemented here.

When I say “god mode” it means that the key can do anything. The current multisig is “god mode” and the proposed dev multisig is also “god mode”. It will be able to do anything that the other keys can do, effectively overriding their power.

There is no mechanism being proposed to keep the dev multisig signers in check, so there is effectively no decentralization occurring. The proposal, as it currently stands, is just theatrics.

At a minimum, this proposal should be rejected and replaced with a proposal that:

• allows ops multisig signers to replace dev multisig signers
• allows DAO tokenholders to vote to change the signers on any of the keys
• removes “god mode” power from dev multisig by removing unnecessary powers, such as contract pause, treasury oversight, etc
• outlines a future phase 2 which will involve burning the multisigs entirely and transferring power to tokenholders, and giving a timeline on which this will occur

[cryptomooniac]

@arkgenesis you are always a valued member of the community, you are very committed and always try to contribute and improve the conversation. However in this case, I feel obliged to remind you about the community guidelines, especially:

Be Agreeable, Even When You Disagree

You may wish to respond to something by disagreeing with it. That’s fine. But remember to criticize ideas, not people… Instead, provide reasoned counter-arguments that improve the conversation.

[cryptomooniac]

You raise some valid points, however you also have to understand that full decentralization is a process and should not happen overnight, especially with a project this young in active development. I think that BIP 33 is one step in the right direction (better than what we have now and necessary) and this is why I support it as phase 1. I don’t see it being just theatrics as you say. Sorry to differ.

However, I would also love to see an outline for future phases (the complete DAO decentralization roadmap - even if it is only a sketch at this point). Because I would like to see what the vision of the core team is, what the next steps would look like, and potentially have thorough discussions as a community around that.

[thRoberto20]

I reached out to you in discord and really appreciate that you’re here in the forums bringing up your points. This is very helpful, and not critical or spreading unnecessary fud. I agree with the spirit of your points, but don’t know the implications or repercussions of meeting your points for further decentralization, therefore I can’t vote for them/against them.
For example, on point three, I am not sure what the implications would be if treasury oversight was completely in the hands of the DAO. In that case, it would seem whales would have the most influence on treasury, which may or may not be in the best interest of the product. Whereas the developers and founders of the DAO have inherent interest in the product and making the treasury function as beneficially for the community as possible. This is just an example, and I think a BIP with your requests with an explanation of the repercussions/implications of your points would help clarify your rationale.

[gismar]

(post withdrawn by author, will be automatically deleted in 24 hours unless flagged)

[CryptoLamer]

The way you are twisting the facts reminded me of the GNR lyrics:

“And that goes for all of you punks in the press
That want to start shit by printin’ lies instead of the things we said…”

"And in this corner, weighing in at 850 pounds; … BADGER DAO
GET IN THE RING

[chrisblec]

@gismar

So I can only think this is intended to spread misinformation and angst among our community

Um, no.

@gismar

I hope you know how a gnosis safe and general multisig contracts work, nobody is ‘creating keys and distributing them’. You enter with your public key and the private key is yours and only yours.

It seems that you are the one that doesn’t understand how multisigs work, gnosis safe or otherwise. One person can easily create a gnosis safe multisig with 5 keys that they themselves created, then distribute private keys to 4 other people while holding all 5 themselves.

@gismar

So we’re ignoring the fact that it is very much possible to limit the transactions that a certain multisig wallet can do, simply by not having the same wallet be governance for every smart contract and every function

I have no idea what you are talking about. In BIP 33 it clearly states that the dev multisig will have all of the god-mode powers that it has currently. It is not being limited based on this proposal.

@gismar

The multisig signers are public and known members of the community, so saying that all of them need to be kept in check is quite absurd. There’s a certain level of trust in people required to even function in society, so stating that we now cannot trust people that have acquired the trust of many others and are known for that, is, well, again. absurd.

Are you new to crypto & DeFi? Are you new to Badger, in fact? The entire point of this project is to empower the community to make decisions without a core team calling the shots. It doesn’t matter in this case if they are known or anon. The reason for this isn’t just about trusting integrity, but also about trusting that the core team won’t be compromised - either by thieves, hackers or governments. Saying that users should just be expected to trust in the dev team for eternity without making constant efforts to decentralize is completely off base.

@gismar

It seems that you have a bias against devs.

Dumb.

@gismar

Agree as far as DAO should have a vote on proposed multisig signers, as you must know, having DAO propose and vote individual ones is very much outside the realm of practicability.

Why is it outside the “realm of practicability” for the DAO to actually control this project? It is, actually, the entire aim of this project… are you sure you’re not in the wrong project?

@gismar

1/10 stars, would not answer again.

You seem to hate intelligent debate. Good luck in your future endeavors.

[chrisblec]

@cryptomooniac

I think that BIP 33 is one step in the right direction (better than what we have now and necessary)

The only thing that makes BIP 33 better than what we have now is that there is a timelock added. There is no purpose to the additional multisigs as their decisions can be easily overridden by the god-mode dev multisig. This is the very definition of decentralization theatre.

@thRoberto20

For example, on point three, I am not sure what the implications would be if treasury oversight was completely in the hands of the DAO.

Treasury oversight wouldn’t need to be in the hands of the DAO. It would be in the hands of the new Ops Multisig as laid out in BIP 33. My problem is that the new proposal is putting things like treasury power in the hands of the new, weaker multisigs, but also reserving the power to override and control those same powers for the devs. If the devs were serious about decentralizing, they would give up those powers to the weaker multisigs entirely and not hang on to them themselves.

[chrisblec]

I created this video demo for you, sir, to show you how anyone can create all signing keys on a multisig then pass them out.

Chris Blec (ChrisBlec)

[DeFiFrog]

Posted to snapshot: Snapshot

[DCAngel]

Noting here that multisig is only a stop-gap for true decentralized consensus gov…something which is still largely in beta evolution ecosystem wide. The entire concept is unproven an largely experimental…but we should be able to work it out eventually.

[cryptomooniac]

@chrisblec

It seems that you are the one that doesn’t understand how multisigs work, gnosis safe or otherwise. One person can easily create a gnosis safe multisig with 5 keys that they themselves created, then distribute private keys to 4 other people while holding all 5 themselves.

Yes, this is true as you have proven with your little video. But does that mean that the keys will be created this way? Is it the only way? Do you think that the community members or industry leaders that will hold keys will actually be accomplices of such a deception?

@gismar

This to me seems just like a very lame attempt to create FUD, or you are totally new to this. Since I don’t know you, I can’t say which of both it is.

@chrisblec

Are you new to crypto & DeFi? Are you new to Badger, in fact?

Please observe community guidelines: You may wish to respond to something by disagreeing with it. That’s fine. But remember to criticize ideas, not people… Instead, provide reasoned counter-arguments that improve the conversation.

I am really sorry to see that it has become personal for both parties (both Chris and the team) instead of listening to each other’s arguments and build from there, which is a necessary condition for any civil conversation. This is why this is getting nowhere.

@DeFiFrog

Posted to snapshot: Snapshot

The questions asked by @fsbadger above were ignored and I think they are important. I know that the core team is very busy at the moment, but I would love to see more interaction addressing community questions or concerns. Just feedback.

I am also sorry that the team did not outline the plan for future phases (even a rough indication of what the future might look like and what the next steps might be).